

National security of Ukraine in the modern world: Problems of strategic communications development in the context of European integration

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Abstract: The article attempts to conduct theoretical analysis of today security paradigms based on the case of national security of Ukraine in the context of current Russo-Ukrainian war and its surrounding landscape of interests and discourses. Interests of various players and stakeholders, as well as corresponding prospects are analyzed. The findings allowed raising the problematic of alternative peacemaking and peacebuilding – through strategic communications and geoeconomics discourse.

Keywords: *Geopolitics, Interests, International relations, National security, Neorealism, Russo-Ukrainian war.*

1. Introduction

The era of anarchy, unrest, and bloodshed has replaced the early perception of globalization as a source of growth and peace. A fresh definition and face have given national security a new lease of life (Aliexsieienko et al. 2022; Antonova et al., 2022; Panfilova et al. 2023; Ramskyi et al., 2023; Syniuk et al., 2023). The security and stability of the globe are threatened by the emerging multipolar international order, which creates greater opportunities for war and chaos.

Two significant hostilities have dominated the last two years: the Gaza War, which began in October 2023, and the Ukrainian War, which began in February 2022. These geopolitical dangers show and hasten the transition to a new multipolar order, even as they raise the possibility of instability in their individual areas, create uncertainty, and weaken the world economy. They will have significant long-term effects on the institutional, political, financial, and economic underpinnings of the planet. The rapidly changing global order is a commonality between the wars in Gaza and Ukraine. This makes it possible for frozen conflicts to arise in a power-based society where using force to resolve disputes rather than following international law and seeking diplomatic solutions is becoming more common.

The case of Ukraine, however, is much more complex than Gaza case from geopolitical and security points of view, and represents a bright example of neorealism manifestation in post-Cold War era, based on the complex interweaving of often divergent geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of various players, as well as the influence of domestic political processes on the country's national security.

2. Literature Review

As is well known, liberalism places a strong emphasis on the value of institutions and holds that an efficient international system is crucial (Simon, 2017). This assertion is obviously refuted by the UN's utterly inert involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian War. More significantly, the neoliberal preference for absolute advantages makes it simple to overlook the importance and standing of relative benefits in national decision-making.

In this spirit, it should be mentioned that the neorealism of international politics emerged in the 1970s and was considered, in the new international setting, a revision and complement to classic realism. Conventional realism has a negative outlook on international cooperation and maintains that conflicts of interest between nations are unavoidable in the process of international communication. On the one hand, Kenneth Waltz's neorealists carried on the fundamentals of realism. However, they also created their own ideas in response to the evolving state of world affairs. First and foremost, statism is a hallmark of neorealism. Neorealist theory views nations as functioning as a single unit. However, it is believed that international politics is a system structure that is formed independently of state intent and is propelled by the impulsive acts of individual nations (Smith and Dawson, 2022).

Neorealism uses the approach of structure analysis of power between the national distribution to advocate for the anarchy of the international community. Additionally, it encourages the fusion of international conflict and worldwide collaboration and highlights the potential for international cooperation within reasonable bounds. International players in the global system are able to uphold certain norms and order, maintaining the system's overall stability. Second, neorealism is centered on utility. The goal of neorealism is to pursue the nation's unilateral interests while highlighting the relative benefits (Ripsman et al., 2018).

Simultaneously, security has drawn several meanings, much as identity, peace, and other terms in that subfield of international political science (Kryshtanovych, M. et al. 2023a-2023c; Kryshtanovych, S. et al., 2022; Pachomova et al., 2023; Polovtsev et al. 2023; Tanashchuk et al., 2024). Regretfully, a lot of authors approach these ideas through the lens of their own ideology. As a result, the term "security" can be used to describe a variety of things (Kupchak et al., 2023). It should come as no surprise that acting within the boundaries of security is so ambiguous given how difficult it is to define. People and governments have done things in the name of security that have difficult-to-handle intentional and unforeseen consequences (Nekhai et al., 2024). Security as a notion is utilized to attract and whip up patronage for numerous political undertakings at the state and international levels of politics because of its seeming lack of conceptual boundaries. Consequently, Paul D. Williams correctly said in his 2008 article that "security is therefore a powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority items in the competition for government attention" (Williams, 2008).

The definition of security given by Samuel Makinda (Makinda, 1998) as "the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions, and values of society" seems appropriate in this situation. He goes on to say that "military and non-military threats" should be avoided by safeguarding all of society's institutions, values, and structures, including its citizens (Makinda, 1998). An essential part of this definition is the phrase "preservation", which implies specific, intentional, and deliberate activities and processes. Therefore, a society's opinion of its leadership influences its actions and directs its efforts, as shown by the scope and depth of that society's security agenda.

Additionally, Monti and Wacks (2022) review the conventional notion of state sovereignty and assess the evolving nature of national security by drawing on a number of case studies. They draw attention to a few of the shortcomings in the traditional conceptions of national security, public policy, and the rule of law.

A significant number of renowned scientists, including Walter Lippmann, Arnold Wolfers, David A. Baldwin, Barry Buzan, and others, have emphasized the importance of values in the framework of national security. The reason the debates over this subject haven't ended is that there are differing views on how national security, as a value, relates to other social values. A. Wolfers contends that national security is the highest value and that all other values are subservient to it as an absolute good (Ozkan et al., 2023). The notion that "security is valued by individuals, families, states, and other actors" such that "security, however, is not the only thing they value; and the pursuit of security necessitates the sacrifice of other values" (Baldwin, 1997) broadened this statement after 40 years. These viewpoints are based on Tom Hobbes' theory that security is the public interest in defending citizens' most prized possessions, including life, property, freedom, and peace. It became more crucial to establish a definition of security that makes it easier to compare the importance of security to other goals as the Cold War-era argument

over whether and how to reallocate resources from security to other policy objectives dominated public policy discourse (Baldwin, 1997). Then, it became crucial to determine the value of national security, including if it is primary, core, or martial, how much it is worth, and whether it poses a danger to other societal values.

The debate over whether national security should be seen as a social good and the idea of national security are currently being discussed. However, the scientific viewpoint holds that people or their groups choose the priorities for national security based on their own value systems or by taking into account the challenges to certain values. One of the many problems that have arisen since the turn of the twenty-first century is whether or not society's ideals endanger national security. In 2014, the General Jonas Zemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania researchers in the Humanities department created an exam designed to gauge military perspectives on matters pertaining to Lithuanian national security. A survey using questionnaires was distributed to cadets, professional troops, and officers. There were inquiries into both internal and foreign dangers to national security. The testing results indicate that professional militaries viewed the decline in values as a greater threat to the nation's security than inadequate funding for its defense system, despite the fact that at the time, public discussions in Lithuania were focused on issues related to national budgeting for security and defense (see Fig. 1). Their professional expertise and life experiences may account for the discrepancy between the views of professional military (36%) and cadets (18%), who have identified the crisis of values as a concern. However, the state's security and defense apparatus is threatened by the inaction of its inhabitants, according to both sets of respondents (47% and 48%). The test findings indicate that the human element plays a critical role in the national security system and in guiding individual and societal ideals that serve as the cornerstones of all human endeavors.




Figure 1. The most important internal threats to national security, according to survey in Lithuania, 2014 (Petrauskaite and Kazlauskaite Markeliene, 2018)

Values therefore have a crucial role in both strengthening and mobilizing society in the face of threats and undermining the nation's security and defense infrastructure. The authorities emphasize the value of values in maintaining national security in their strategy papers. The USA's national security policy places a strong emphasis on the role that democratic principles - such as freedom of the press, expression, and thought - have in strengthening society and making it more resistant to modern dangers. The final threat, danger, and risk listed in the Republic of Lithuania's 2017 National Security Strategy is referred to as a "crisis of values".

This is, in fact, rather similar reflection of the internal security threats inherent in today Ukraine, which, unfortunately, rarely is a subject of study of Ukrainian domestic scholars. The internal critical problems are discussed predominantly only by some journalists and experts. Meanwhile, these problems ultimately constitute a real threat even to 'external' national security of Ukraine, especially under current conditions of war – for example, corruption in military provision services and evident decrease in citizens' motivation to enter the military and fight for the country liberation from occupiers lead to more difficulties in the battlefield and deteriorate Ukraine' image in the eyes of Western partners, thus decreasing geopolitical potential of the country. In turn, these internal challenges belong to the array of factors determining Ukraine' vision of national security and prospects of the current war, as well as building relationships with allies and partners. At the same time, strategic communication involves multiple actors in international affairs. Governments, international organizations, non-state actors, and public all play significant roles in shaping and implementing strategic communication strategies, and here the choice of overall paradigm both for planning/acting and narratives plays crucial role.

3. Methods

The methodological basis of the study is represented by the fundamental theoretical provisions of modern political and military science. The work widely used the main geopolitical theories, works of scientists and military-political experts devoted to the socio-philosophical analysis of national security.

The study used systemic, structural-functional, historical methods, as well as the method of analysis and synthesis, classification and systematization, theoretical generalization and description.

In the process of study, the methodology of general systems theory and methods for studying complex social objects were applied: systems approach, systems analysis, unity of historical and logical, methods of modeling, formalization and extrapolation of social and political processes, etc.

4. Results

John J. Mearsheimer stresses the significance of structural variables impacting states and the international system and its influence over discourses from a neorealist viewpoint (Mearsheimer, 1994). According to Vivienne Jabri, attitudes about war and how people behave in groups are influenced by the social environment. The discourses and interactions between various groups about conflicts can be defined by this social environment, just as the discourses and interactions can determine the social context (Jabri, 1996). As a result, discourse analysis cannot be applied just to communication and language. Understanding the various social groupings and the social milieu is also necessary. To comprehend the embedded environment in which discourses are integrated, discourse analysis would require the assistance of other social sciences and instruments. Discourses can be powerful tools for inciting people to fight by presenting certain versions of reality. One such example is the radio campaign that targeted Hutu ethnic groups by referring to Tutsi ethnic groups as "cockroaches" and portraying them as a threat to the nation prior to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. To be useful for societies in the developing world facing security challenges, discourse analysis in the Rwanda example would require an understanding of the political context, identity formation process, economic factors, interactions of the different actors with other national and international actors, etc.

What part can regional organizations like the European Union play in maintaining peace and security in the modern world is a crucial subject today. Winston Churchill believed during the Second World War that multipolar international order, based on regional security arrangements, might

maintain the balance of power and avert another global conflict. Regional arrangements do, in fact, contribute to multipolarity in the modern world, but they also appear to have negative effects and to create conflict discourses that jeopardize national, regional, and even international security (Blagden, 2015).

Compared to Asia, Europe has not experienced regionalism in the same way. Europe took part in two primary types of “security” agreements during the Cold War. Since the two superpowers established and oversaw the primary regional security organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, they constituted a type of “hegemonic regionalism”. This opposition has reappeared since the second decade of the twenty-first century, albeit in a slightly different form. While NATO works to create a “buffer zone” by integrating Ukraine, Russia primarily uses geoeconomic tools, particularly energy sources, and aggressive soft power instruments akin to China’s “magic weapon” (Brady, 2017). NATO membership and Ukraine’s de facto EU membership are related. In terms of its regional politics, Russia regards Ukraine as one of the “first places” concurrently. confrontation between these interests resulted in armed confrontation in the Donbass in 2014 and full-scale war in 2022, which was made worse by a lack of openness and efficient strategic communication.

By the end of the 1990s, neorealism political scientist Kenneth Waltz explained a parabolic relationship between security and power, which he hypothesized resulted from balancing. The state ought to amass sufficient strength to discourage adversaries, but not so much that it compels them to act in opposition to it. Thus, expanding capacities past a certain point may prove counterproductive (Waltz as cited in Kang & Kugler, 2023). The state ought to amass sufficient strength to discourage adversaries, but not so much that it compels them to act in opposition to it. Thus, enhancing talents over a certain point may start to backfire.

Davide Fiammenghi (2011) adds the term “bandwagoning” as a third part to this parabola. A state may occasionally gain so much power that it is unbeatable by any other state or combination of states. Hence, joining the bandwagon is the only choice. Fiammenghi outlines a three-stage modified parabolic link between power and security. Any rise in a state’s power during the first stage translates into an improvement in security for that state since stronger governments are better able to entice friends and fend off adversaries. The state’s security starts to erode in the second stage as allies start to turn against the state and opponents start to organize as a result of the continuous development of capabilities. In the third stage, opponents are forced to “bandwagon” since the state has so much power.

The instance of Ukraine serves as a real-world example of these theoretical security curve measures. The beginning of Ukraine’s close collaboration with NATO had a favorable impact on the nation’s armed forces and sent a message to Russia about the neighbor state’s increasing military capacity. Back in 2019, experts observed that military spending in Ukraine skyrockets (see Fig. 2).

Year	bln UAH
2014	15,1
2015	45,8
2016	59,4
2017	68,8
2018	86,6
2019	102,5
2020	117,5




Figure 2.
Dynamics of Ukraine’ military budget, 2014-2020 (Abbasi, 2023).

Prior to 2022, Ukraine's military budget was already trending upward. Prior to Russia's full-scale invasion and after the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine increased its military spending by 73% between 2014 and 2021. When seen from a ten-year perspective, the growth rates were even more astounding: 1661 percent growth between 2013 and 2022 (Tian et al., 2023).

By erecting a network of 12 covert surveillance bases along the Russian border, the CIA has been covertly assisting Ukraine in its conflict with Russia for more than ten years. The aforementioned is mentioned in the February 2024 New York Times article written by Entous and Schwirtz (Entous and Schwirtz, 2024). According to journalists, they spoke with over 200 officials from Europe, the US, and Ukraine. According to the officials, the CIA has been cooperating with Ukraine for over ten years. Through this collaboration, Washington now counts Ukraine as one of its most significant intelligence allies in the battle against the Kremlin, despite the country's long-standing perception that Russia has corrupted its intelligence agencies (Entous and Schwirtz, 2024). As the third year of a war that has taken hundreds of thousands of lives approaches, the authors correctly point out that the intelligence cooperation between Washington and Kyiv is essential to Ukraine's self-defense. The C.I.A. and other U.S. intelligence organizations follow the movements of Russian troops, maintain espionage networks, and give intelligence for targeted missile attacks. It is difficult to argue against that, in fact.

However, the very fact of creation these spy bases actually placed Ukraine into the above-mentioned security curve described by Fiammenghi.

5. Discussion

Over the course of several decades, NATO has steadily grown outside of its initial mandate in Western Europe, absorbing new members and tasks that have allowed it to go considerably deeper into the former Soviet domain. But Eastern European nations, from Bulgaria in the south to Estonia in the north, are shivering in response to Russia's interference in Ukraine. The most potent military alliance in the world has left its newest members feeling exposed and raising doubts about its commitment to their safety.

Since NATO is a mutual defense alliance, any attack on one member country is regarded as an attack on all of them. But NATO did not go on with creating plans for the defense of its newest members for years after the small Baltic countries joined the alliance. In deference to Putin's claims that NATO was encroaching too far into his sphere of influence, the alliance likewise refrained from conducting training exercises in the Baltics (Witte, 2014).

Regarding the Ukraine crisis, French and German credibility has dropped to unprecedented levels, endangering European security as each country tries to bolster its political and geopolitical clout. There is little unity, and the military industry has shown to have sway over state policies about EU membership in the security domain.

In the several crises that beset the European Union (EU) in the twenty-first century, the French-German duopoly - dubbed the "integration engine" - played a pivotal role. However, both Western European integration leaders lost prominence following Moscow's attack against Ukraine in 2022. The nations that make up NATO's eastern flank, led by Poland and the Baltic states, were the major providers of help for the battle against Ukraine. Among other things, Germany and France opposed Kiev, defended themselves against too harsh sanctions placed on Moscow, and opposed Ukraine's entry into the EU and NATO.

In response to Moscow's aggression against Ukraine, Berlin and Paris acted for reasons more than only economic ones. Even more crucial were geopolitical factors. With few exceptions, Western European elites have long collaborated with Russia and saw it as a significant political and economic friend. Both Western European nations want strategic autonomy from Washington and reconciliation with Beijing and Moscow as their geopolitical objectives. Throughout history, Berlin and Moscow have viewed Central Eastern Europe as a shared - or, less commonly, competitive - sphere of influence. Prior to 2022, Berlin's sphere of influence encompassed the Baltic states and Central European nations, while Moscow's comprised Belarus and Ukraine. This is the reason why Western Europe disassociated itself

from Moscow's aggressiveness in 2022, among other reasons. It was unwilling to damage its standing with Moscow. Additionally, it wished to avoid inciting further Russian aggression because it feared a full-scale conflict with NATO. Western Europe desired a speedy accord with Putin in order to restore the former geopolitical and economic order.

However, in 2024, Western Europe's stance on the conflict in Ukraine has changed. First, Germany stepped up its military and financial support, but it persisted in obstructing the transfer of the most advanced weaponry that President Volodymyr Zelensky had demanded to Kiev. The sanctions on Moscow were tightened by France and Germany, but there were still several ways for the Kremlin to get around them. Berlin and Paris, meantime, lifted their veto on Ukraine's EU membership, but they did not soften their stance against Kiev joining NATO. Both Western European nations' influence led to a rise in the EU's military and financial support for Kiev. In comparison to Ukraine's requirements, it remained insufficient, and Brussels encountered significant challenges and setbacks when it came to implementing aid pledges. President Emmanuel Macron, who declared in 2024 that France would send soldiers to Ukraine, was the most radicalized individual. During the same year, officials from Germany suggested that NATO forces guard the airspace above western Ukraine from Romanian and Polish territory.

What led to this drastic change in Berlin and Paris is the question. First and foremost, both nations were losing political clout in Central Europe and Ukraine as well as in NATO and the EU, according to Professor Tomasz Grosse of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Growing unhappiness with their approach in the US was as perilous, especially for German politicians. German concerns were that Washington would turn its attention away from Berlin and onto NATO's eastern flank, particularly Warsaw. Moreover, Germany and France were less and less convinced in repairing positive ties with Moscow. Furthermore, they held little expectation that their "neutral attitude" would shield Europe from Putin's continued aggressiveness, especially his assaults on NATO and EU nations (Grosse, 2024).

At this juncture, a diplomatic push was started by both Western European nations to bring about reforms inside the European Union. The main goal was to boost the political might of the two biggest Western European nations by amending EU treaties. As a result, among other things, the elimination of the requirement for unanimity when voting on military and foreign policy was suggested. This provided the nations with the most voting power - Germany and France - an edge when making decisions. Furthermore, initiatives were undertaken to fortify the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Increasing ammunition and weapon manufacture using EU money was the major objective. Such moves were usually taken with the intention of restricting arms exports from non-EU countries, such as the US and South Korea, and bolstering the power of arms companies in Western Europe. Europe produces far too few guns and ammunition, therefore it goes without saying that in the case of a true danger from the East, the EU should not impose restrictions on the transfer of arms from non-EU partners. However, the European Commission's actions after 2022 made it evident that they were rewarding help to French and German firms and limiting access to weaponry imports from outside the EU.

In light of a genuine threat to the EU and NATO, these attempts to fortify the EU's strategic autonomy against Washington are naive. Furthermore, France and Germany have attempted to imitate the North Atlantic Alliance's organizational structures, emphasizing the expansion of the EU's rapid reaction forces (as opposed to NATO's, which were significantly more limited in terms of both numbers and equipment), rather than primarily supporting coordination within NATO. To put it another way, their objectives were more political than defensive. In order to fulfill the goal of strengthening Franco-German leadership in Europe, the EU's security mechanisms were to be developed with support (Kussainov et al., 2023).

Therefore, neorealist aspirations of dominant states in the EU, rather than neoliberal beliefs that the primary objective of actors in international relations is international security and that the anarchy of international relations (Absence of supreme power) is surmountable, continue to be the decisive factor

despite Ukraine's strong efforts to develop effective strategic communications with the EU on the path to integration.

Long-term, it is no secret that the United States is now more worried about China's rise to superpower status than it was about Russia, its former adversary. China currently appears to be the biggest challenge to US hegemony, even with its economy slowing down. This is because of the country's slow population growth and the younger generation's growing mistrust of the American ideal, which makes them less ready to make sacrifices for it. In light of all said above, it now appears feasible for Washington to reduce its help to the region and maybe even exit completely or gradually, especially if Donald Trump - the leading proponent of US withdrawal - wins the 2024 elections.

The issue of Ukraine's national security is still up for debate and uncertainty in this environment. Both Russians and Ukrainians view this as an existential struggle, although for similar but different reasons: neither side is ready to give up on its battlefield successes, even if they are not what it had hoped for (Sapio, 2024).

In addition to having a significant impact on world politics, the international system, and world order, the Russia-Ukraine war has also had a significant impact on the realignment of political blocs. This is due to the fact that the war involves a complicated fight and game between Russia, the US, and Europe in addition to political violence between Russia and Ukraine (Liu and Shu, 2023).

While many Western countries have backed Ukraine, there are still significant conflicts within Europe, and several African states and China continue to be Moscow's supporters.

Tensions start to emerge and intensify inside the EU. Specifically, shortly after the Israel-Hamas war began, a social media post went popular in Romania, alleging that the Bucharest administration had assisted in the 3,000 Ukrainians who were evacuated from Israel but had not assisted the Romanians who were stranded in the battle. It was all untrue. George Simion, the head of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), which has become the principal opposition party in the nation, wrote the post. Concerns over Romania's potential to become another EU and NATO nation unwilling to back Kyiv in its defensive struggle against Russian aggression have been raised in European capitals as a result of its ascent. AUR, which means "gold" in Romanian, has benefited from the growing anti-Ukrainian feeling by spreading falsehoods and misinformation. Since the 2019 elections, its support among voters has doubled to almost 20%, right behind the Social Democrats in power. According to voters' choices for the presidential elections, Simion himself is ranked third (Dunai, 2023).

Similar to Poland's Confederation party, which has chastised the Warsaw administration for permitting the importation of cheap Ukrainian grain, AUR is against agricultural goods from Ukraine passing via Romania. The party opposes both Bucharest's continued provision of armaments to Kyiv and its hosting of Ukrainian pilots for F-16 fighter aircraft training.

Taking into account the real threat to Romania from drones that Russia is using to fire at Ukraine's Danube port infrastructure, support of Simion in Romania can become even stronger.

Talk of a third world war, a collapse of nations, a nuclear Armageddon, or even the end of civilization itself is commonplace these days. This battle is of worldwide importance and generates debate, terror, and exaggeration on a similarly global scale. The ongoing Ukrainian onslaught in the Russian Kursk area raises the possibility that NATO will be drawn into the conflict, increasing the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be deployed and that the war will worsen. Times like this are dangerous. In the event that US policy is successful and the Russians are losing to the Ukrainians in combat, Putin may resort to using nuclear weapons to turn things around. The world is on the verge of new version of Cuban Missile Crisis, but today situation is even more dangerous than in 1962, since much more players and stakeholders are involved in the conflict, and Middle East extreme tension also pours oil on the flame.

Within this landscape, national security of Ukraine in fact became the base of regional and international security, and strategic communications of Ukraine in the context of European integration seem to be the only tool to achieve this security. Although the fighting makes admittance more difficult, Ukraine can gradually achieve the requirements for admission. In addition to the formal membership

discussions, Ukraine would gain from a gradual assimilation of the nation into EU policy. In addition to introducing Ukraine into fields like energy cooperation and decarbonization, that would demonstrate to the Ukrainian people the real advantages of advancing toward EU norms. In other words, international political economy and geoeconomics should become the pillars of peacebuilding in Ukrainian case. In the neorealist international relations, including armed conflicts, accordingly pragmatic tools should be used for peacemaking and peacebuilding. In particular, instead of harsh critique on anti-Ukrainian politicians' statements in Slovakia, Romania, etc., it is rational for Ukraine to initiate joint projects in transportation, newest digital technologies (in which Ukraine is not of the leaders now), and so on.

6. Conclusions

The process of Ukraine's entering into NATO is motivated by various geopolitical interests of the parties concerned and carries significant geopolitical ramifications for them. From Ukraine's perspective, integration to NATO is, first of all, simply a civilizational choice between Russia and the West to abandon the Russian geopolitical axis. The crucial problem is de-facto neoliberal approach of Ukraine to international relations, ties, and conflicts, while, as it was showed in the article, the West adheres to neorealist approach. Thus, Ukrainian public management should think and act more in rationalistic than idealistic discourse and planes, to be 'on the same wavelength' with the West and regain the status of a subject of geopolitics, not its object or even worse – polygon of proxy war. Effective 'arsenal' of strategic communications should be developed, to successfully navigate between the existential narratives of Putin's Russia and the attempts of some Western countries to use the war in Ukraine to achieve their geopolitical interests, and successfully resist both of these threats to country's national security.

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