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Адреса редакції:

01054, Київ, вул. Володимирська, 44, Інститут географії НАН України Телефон: +380(44)234-04-92

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Karolyi, H.1 (ii) 0009-0006-1480-7245 Akimov, O. O.4 (D) 0000-0002-9557-2276 Akimova, L. M.² (D) 0000-0002-2747-2775 Karpa, M. I. 5 (D) 0000-0001-8141-4894 Mishchuk, H. Y.3 0000-0003-4520-3189

- ¹ John von Neumann University, Budapest
- ² National University of Water and Environmental Engineering, Rivne
- ³ Széchenyi Istvàn University, Győr
- ⁴ Scientific and Methodological Center for Personnel Policy of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyiv
- ⁵ Hryhorii Skovoroda University in Pereiaslav, Pereiaslav

Military Migration and Demographic Transformations in Ukraine: **Military Consequences for Territorial Communities**

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Population migration is one of the natural phenomena that occurs in society regardless of the form of social and economic system, and is considered within the framework and at the intersection of various sciences. However, military migration has its unique features and a distinct landscape of its processes, occurrences, and ongoing developments. The subject of this research is the complex of problems related to military migration in Ukraine, as well as its impact on the socio-economic development of territorial communities. The article aims to map both visible situations and latent processes in the territorial communities of Ukraine caused by military migration during the Russo-Ukrainian War. It is demonstrated that the consequences of military migration have both positive and negative aspects, thereby becoming a source of conflict and contributing to a decline in living standards within territorial communities. The need to combine the efforts of government bodies, civil society, and stakeholders in a comprehensive study of the consequences of military migration on communities is emphasized to develop effective models and strategies to overcome negative patterns. The fundamental issues surrounding military migration are reexamined to incorporate some of the significant new field data that has surfaced recently and to outline the policy implications of the results.

Keywords: internal migration; civil society; conflicts; military migration implications; communities resilience; social integration.

Background

Military operations and subsequent population relocation have a significant impact on demographic structures. Both sending and receiving regions may experience changes in population composition, age distributions, and gender ratios as a result of forced migration, which is often a direct consequence of armed conflict. Long-term population imbalances, societal instability, and greater resource pressure are all possible outcomes of these shifts. Furthermore, there are other repercussions of militarism.

In many parts of the world, border militarization and the criminalization of migration intensified following 9/11. The Global North has undoubtedly been surpassed by the Global South and Global East in the securitization and criminalization of individuals on the move. Scholars have shown that militarization is a corollary of these processes, significantly compromising the right to asylum and security of those who are on the move, such as in the Mediterranean [1] and along the U.S.-Mexico border [2]. These procedures are also taking place at the borders

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between Poland and Belarus, as well as Mexico and Guatemala. The criminalization and securitization of migration, particularly in light of hostile acts by other nations, is what drives militarization.

Massive and unanticipated migration has resulted from Russia's assaults on Ukraine. The 2014 takeover of Crimea was followed by the first wave of migration triggered by the war. Moreover, over 8 million people were displaced as a result of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which presents social and economic difficulties for the host nations. The European Union's decision to implement the Temporary Protection Directive granted Ukrainian refugees previously unheard-of, unrestricted access to the job markets of host nations. Post-communist nations, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, are primarily the ones most impacted for each person by the influx of Ukrainian migrants. These nations are not recognized as destinations for immigration. On the contrary, they have seen a significant exodus after the fall of the Iron Curtain, particularly among highly educated residents. Emigration may rise as a result of increased competition in their labor markets brought on by the abrupt influx of Ukrainians. However, an analysis of the consequences of the Ukrainian exodus to Poland after Russia's 2014 incursion indicates that an immigration shock may result in a decline in emigration in a post-communist nation with an excess of highly educated inhabitants [3].

On the other hand, military migration causes demographic problems in the countries from which the migrants originate. Notably, both those who have stayed and those who have returned have been significantly impacted by the large-scale migration out of Syria, which is primarily the result of the ongoing conflict. The most notable effects are difficulties in obtaining necessities, a reduction in vital services, and the loss of livelihoods. Due to the disruption of trade networks, the loss of trained personnel, and general instability, many localities have experienced a decline in economic activity. Due to the continuous fighting, Syrian infrastructure and local populations are confronting several difficulties, such as extensive infrastructure devastation, substantial unemployment, and financial hardship. These difficulties hinder efforts at rehabilitation and exacerbate already existing socioeconomic injustices. Communities' capacity to recover and reintegrate is impacted by the continuous displacement that occurs both within and outside.

Furthermore, the capital, Damascus, was reached by an armed opposition group operation that started in northwest Syria on November 27, 2024, and swiftly expanded to other regions of the nation. Approximately one million people have been freshly displaced from locations such as the Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Idlib governorates since the onslaught began on November 27. This was at least the second time that more than one in five had experienced displacement.

Communities in Ukraine that are near the front line face comparable difficulties. The forced mass exodus of Ukrainians, both domestically and internationally, has been one of the war's most agonizing societal effects. Due to the forced migration of millions of Ukrainians, there has been a notable labor drain, especially from rural regions. The war has dramatically worsened the population situation in Ukraine. Human resources have been severely depleted as a result of the mass forced exodus of the economically active people. Local communities in Ukraine face several difficulties as a result of forced migration, such as depleted resources, heightened social unrest, and interruptions to vital services like healthcare and education. Furthermore, the influx of displaced people may exacerbate already existing socioeconomic issues and impact nearby companies. Investigating the complex landscape of these challenges represents a relevant task in both the theoretical and practical aspects of military migration.

Literature Review

While Ukrainian scientists focus predominantly on the statistical, as well as legal and public administration aspects of forced internal migration, foreign scholars have studied the phenomenon and its implications from theoretical perspectives.

Grinshtain and Hariv [4] specifically examined internal mobility among evacuees in the northern periphery of Israel as a result of forced relocation. Their study aimed to investigate the emotions of evacuees and the factors surrounding internal migration as a more voluntary process following a forced internal displacement among evacuated parents in the current situation in Israel. The variables that parents consider or discuss when looking for a location to move to during difficult times were described using the Push-Pull Motivation theory as a framework. The main places of origin and destination are located on Israel's northern periphery, which is characterized by distinct topographical

features, including proximity to Israel's borders and distance from the country's center. Furthermore, the places outside the periphery were represented by temporarily evacuated locales, which were considered both origin and destination. Fifty semi-structured interviews with parents of K-12 pupils served as the basis for the phenomenological method. Three themes emerged from the thematic analysis of the emotions surrounding the evacuation: an intense worry for the children's welfare, a sense of detachment, and a lack of free will. Additionally, four scenarios are used to illustrate how push and pull variables overlap both within and outside the perimeter, demonstrating internal migration issues. Economic, emotional-sentimental, ideological, and parental-familial influences were among the driving forces that led to the periphery.

Bell et al. [5] present connections between measures of population redistribution and country development and provide a broad theoretical model for how internal migration redistributes people among settlement systems during the development process.

Overall, internal migration and displacement are complex social processes that occur within state boundaries but are driven by a variety of variables and have distinct repercussions [6]. Internal migration is a voluntary process motivated by personal, economic, or social factors of individuals or families that results in population mobility inside a country for a variety of causes [7]. In contrast, displacement refers to the forced transfer of people as a result of emergencies or wars [8–9].

Internal migration has a wide-ranging influence on society and the economy. It can result in large population shifts. This population mobility not only changes the demographic makeup of various regions, but it also creates issues for local governments. In places where migrants are accepted, there may be greater demand on infrastructure and public services such as housing, transportation, education, and health, necessitating effective planning on the side of the authorities [10–11]. Aside from the demographic and infrastructure consequences, internal migration has a considerable impact on the labor market. It has the potential to modify the supply and demand for labor in various places, influencing employment patterns and salaries.

Internal migration, on the other hand, has far-reaching social and cultural consequences in addition to economic and demographic ramifications. Although internal migration happens inside the

same nation, migrants may experience difficulties in social and cultural integration in their new communities. This emphasizes the need for social integration initiatives [12-14]. These problems highlight the significance of an inclusive and responsive domestic migration strategy. Given the complexities and broad repercussions of internal migration, successful management necessitates a comprehensive approach that tackles all facets of the phenomena. First, competent urban planning is required to adjust infrastructure and services in immigrant-receiving communities. To balance population mobility, employment strategies should generate possibilities in various places [15]. It is also critical to create programs that enhance internal migrants' social integration in their new communities [16-17].

Aim

The article aims to map both visible situations and latent processes in the territorial communities of Ukraine caused by military migration during the Russo-Ukrainian War.

Methods

The theoretical and methodological basis of the study included scientific provisions on migration issues, works of domestic Ukrainian and foreign scientists on matters of the regulation of internal migration processes. The following research methods were used in the work: inductive and deductive, comparative-historical analysis, and dynamic and systemic approaches. The method of comparative analysis was also used, involving consideration of the experience of Syria in the aspect of migration processes.

The research toolkit employed qualitative content analysis and elements of grounded theory. While categorization within grounded theory was applied for planning and conducting the search for literature sources to be included in the final sample for analysis, qualitative content analysis was used to investigate the sample and reveal appropriate data, correlations, and patterns. The choice of method was determined by the fact that content analysis of qualitative data is a process of identifying patterns, themes, and trends in textual data, allowing for indepth insights into the studied phenomena.

Results and Discussion

The very fact of forced displacement of the population as a result of the war, its massiveness, is a




Fig. 1. Age structure of internally displaced persons, % [18]

challenge to social stability. The first wave of forced internal displacements arose in Ukraine in 2014. As a result of the annexation of Crimea and the hybrid war in part of the Donbass, approximately 1.5 million IDPs were registered. The full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, led to an increase in the number of forced internal migrants by approximately 3.5 million people. As of mid-June 2023, 4,872,000 IDPs were registered by the relevant authorities. Among the migrants who found themselves in a situation of forced displacement after the start of the Russian invasion, 61% are women and 39% are men. Approximately one-third (27%) are children under 18 years of age. 20% are people over 60 years of age (Fig. 1). Moreover, the war forced 700 people aged 100 and over to leave their homes [18]. This, in turn, leads to changes in the territorial distribution of population and the formation of specific territorial clusters [19].

According to the Institute of Demography and Quality of Life Problems of the NAS of Ukraine, as of early January 2022, the population of Ukraine was 42 million, including people living in temporarily occupied territories. As of August 2023, this figure had decreased to 36.3 million, of which 31.5 million live in territories controlled by the Ukrainian authorities [20-21]. According to estimates by the International Organization for Migration, as of September 2023, the number of Ukrainians who were forced to change their place of residence after February 24, 2022, was 3.7 million. The demographic composition of IDPs, as reported by the IOM survey, is approximately the same as that indicated in official data on the registration of forced displacements. Women among IDPs comprise 57.3%, while men make up 42.7%. Children under 18 years of age make up 24.4% of IDP families, and people over 60 years of age make up 23.5%. IDP households are characterized by a high proportion of members belonging to vulnerable categories of the population.


More than half of them include disabled or chronically ill people [18]. Therefore, the challenge to social resilience is not only the scale but also the composition of forced displacements. Challenges associated with the scale and structure of forced displacements lead to the spread of risks and their deepening penetration into the fabric of social reality, increasing the level of risk coverage of individuals, social groups, communities, local communities, and society as a whole.

Frontline communities in Ukraine face serious demographic challenges, which are exacerbated by the ongoing war. The primary concerns are population decline, falling birth rates, high mortality rates, an aging population, and large-scale migration, both internal and external. The decrease in population, as seen in Syria, leads to the closure of schools, hospitals, and other social facilities, as well as the deterioration of critical public services.

Meanwhile, rapid self-organization, mutual support, and a willingness to resist the enemy helped Ukrainian society survive the first weeks of a full-scale invasion. Often, the basic unit of resilience was the communities and their local self-government bodies (LSGs), which represented the interests of residents and ensured daily life in times of crisis.

A USAID study [22] examines how the situation following the start of full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine has affected the ability of local communities to respond to the challenges of war and continue to function daily. The analysis is based on the results of a survey in 32 communities in southern, central, and northern Ukraine, including those near the front lines, as well as those that were or are currently under occupation. The study aims to enhance understanding of current community needs and identify recovery priorities with the support of donors and partners. The report is based on interviews with key informants, including representatives of community offices, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), apartment building owners' associations (OSBBs) (or offices of village elders in rural areas), and government services. Although the data collected from selected settlements is not representative of all communities, regions, or macro-regions, the conclusions drawn from it are valuable. The report, based on a survey of community representatives, complements other reSCORE analytical products that rely on data from public opinion polls at the regional level.

Institutional aspects



Community ties (e.g., trust), networks for collective action (e.g., communication mechanisms and public participation)

Democratic values, support for reforms, priority sectors for recovery, and awareness of partner programs

Fig. 2. Community Resilience: Aspects of Analysis [22].

Based on the difference in the sum of the re-SCORE indicators, the overall effectiveness of communities was assessed and classified as more effective and less effective. The analysis also identified key factors that have a significant impact on community effectiveness (including the implementation of pre-war emergency preparedness measures, the availability of mechanisms for public consultations and community cooperation, etc.). It is worth noting that communities that are conditionally less effective according to several reSCORE indicators are distinguished by a half lower level of pre-war emergency preparedness compared to highly effective ones, and almost half the availability of mechanisms for personal or virtual consultations as a form of communication between citizens and authorities. At the same time, more effective communities demonstrate three times higher rates of availability of participatory public budgets and twice as high rates of holding meetings in local community centers, enterprises, schools, and city/village councils. In addition, more effective communities demonstrate more effective collaboration with various groups within the community, including youth, women, and representatives from the community sector.

The authors of the report paid attention to indicators that relate to various aspects of the institutional and social functioning of communities and also allow assessing whether decision-makers in communities are oriented towards recovery (Fig. 2).

Better effectiveness is associated with higher scores on 15 indicators (Tab. 1). In particular, high scores on indicators related to mechanisms of civic participation, such as a participatory budget, the presence of social networks and online chats for communication between citizens and local authorities, and meetings with the city or village council, highlight the positive relationship between active feedback (between officers and the public) and improved community indicators. For example, according to the reSCORE results, communities with higher effectiveness use a participatory budget three times more often and hold meetings in local community centers, businesses, schools, and with the city/village council twice as frequently as communities with lower effectiveness.

Analysis of indicators such as the frequency of contacts and practical cooperation in the community with youth, women, and NGOs reveals that high-quality interaction with various groups that have the potential to influence decisions has a positive impact on the community situation. The frequency and effectiveness of contacts with these groups are more than one point higher in communities with better overall effectiveness indicators, which is considered a significant difference.

Table 1. Factors that define communities with higher performance * [22]

Factors	Average for communities with lower efficiency	Average for communities with higher efficiency	Average for 32 communities surveyed
The presence of civic participation mechanisms for communication between citizens and authorities (in general), including	3.4	5.8	4.3
Participation in the budget process (public participatory budgeting)	1.2	3.6	2.3
Social media and/or online chats	6.8	8.5	7.1
Meetings in local community centers, businesses, schools, etc.	2.9	6.8	4.58
Hotlines	6.3	8.6	7.3
Frequency of public communications on social media and/or online chats	7.8	9.1	8.2
Frequency of public communications through meetings in local community centers, businesses, schools, etc.	3.1	5.6	4.7
Frequency of meetings in the city or village council	2.8	5.1	3.8
Frequency of contacts with youth	4.9	6.0	5.0
Frequency of contacts with women	5.3	6.78	5.7
Effective cooperation with youth	7.1	8.6	7.4
Effective cooperation with CSOs (civil society organizations)	7.3	8.5	7.8
Community collaboration (involves relying on people in the community for help in the event of a serious problem and solving common problems together, such as cleaning up an area or planting trees)	6.0	7.1	6.2
Pluralistic Ukrainian identity (generally, including a diversity of views on language, ethnicity, historical unity, and regional cultural influence, reflecting a nuanced understanding of what it means to be Ukrainian)	7.5	8.8	8.0
High trust in the State Emergency Service of Ukraine	7.6	8.8	7.9

^{*} Scores are given in the range from 0 to 10, where 0 is the complete absence of the phenomenon, and 10 is its maximum possible presence.

Communities are now facing unprecedented challenges as a result of a full-scale war, ranging from the problems of destroyed infrastructure and human resource shortages to the difficulties associated with business relocation or the creation of necessary conditions for military personnel and their families. To better understand these difficulties and identify the needs for their resolution, the Alliance of Ukrainian Universities, with the help of the International Renaissance Foundation, undertook ex-

tensive study in twelve selected towns, each with its own distinctive experience. The cities were chosen for research because of their diversity, ranging from rear regions (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne) to front-line zones and deoccupied settlements (Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk regions). This gives for a deeper understanding of the issues that various areas of Ukraine confront. Particular focus was made to determining community-specific needs in three critical areas: resilience, development, and

rehabilitation. Teams from Alliance-member institutions conducted the research from February to April 2024. During the deep immersion process, a wide range of data was collected, including statistical indicators and individual reports from each community. In particular, the study found that resilience is still the most important issue in the third year of full-scale combat. The majority of studied communities (eight out of twelve) choose resilience as their top priority [23].

Social resilience is an important element measured by an index that takes into account the level of trust of residents in local authorities and their willingness to participate in civic initiatives. The results showed that communities with a high level of social resilience have better indicators of responding to emergencies, as residents are more actively involved in decision-making processes and interaction with authorities. Communities with the worst scores on this indicator indicated a sense of isolation of the settlement from the rest of the community or region. These communities are located in Sumy and Chernihiv regions, which were in the zone of occupation or hostilities. Perhaps such indicators are related to the potential threat of renewed hostilities in these territories and the general unfavorable geographical location of these communities. Here are also some of the highest indicators, compared to other communities, regarding plans to leave the community, even without changes in the security situation. In some places, the responses of residents of a given community who lived in rural areas and cities/towns differed. For example, in a community in Chernihiv region, resilience as a critical need prevailed among rural residents. The research team explains this by the fact that residents of rural areas have less access to communications, and therefore the need is felt especially acutely during crisis situations [21].

Community development encompasses the provision of high-quality services, including education, healthcare, utilities, and business support. An assessment of the quality of secondary education revealed that most communities provide a high level of education. This is a crucial indicator, as education is the foundation for the development of future generations. However, there are problems with the accessibility of educational institutions in some regions, particularly in rural areas.

Healthcare is also an essential aspect of community development [27]. The study found that residents are generally satisfied with the quality of

healthcare services; however, there are issues with the accessibility of healthcare facilities and an insufficient number of healthcare workers. This is especially felt in communities located near the front line, where healthcare facilities are often damaged or destroyed.

The public sector was also surveyed to provide a comprehensive picture. Among the main challenges is the lack of funding for implementing their own projects. Civic activists emphasized the importance of local government support for community development initiatives, which will contribute to their successful implementation. Cooperation between public organizations and local authorities is a crucial factor in effectively addressing social issues and improving the quality of life for residents. It also significantly expands opportunities for attracting resources [23].

The reconstruction of communities after the war's destruction is a critically important aspect of the study. The restoration of infrastructure, housing, and other essential facilities is a top priority for communities. Securing funding for the implementation of reconstruction projects is a significant challenge, as many communities lack sufficient resources to cover these needs independently. It is necessary to attract additional funds from the state budget and from international organizations, as well as improve coordination between different levels of government and organizations for effective reconstruction.

Active citizens and proactive deputies of local councils, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, managed to act despite natural human fear. They worked in a coordinated and collaborative manner, assisting those who could not care for themselves, and at the same time, creating self-defense units.

Characteristically, such results were demonstrated mainly by those communities that, as a result of the decentralization reform, successfully united and effectively used their resources to develop and strengthen autonomy from various state subventions "from above."

At the same time, high adaptability is inherent primarily in large and urban communities—they usually have strong human resource potential and know how to utilize their strengths and weaknesses. The last point is related to strategizing.

An indicator of low community readiness for challenges is decision-making in the "today for yesterday" or "today for today" mode. Instead, planning one's own activities (strategizing or strategic planning) is a bridge to the future, as it is based on a thorough assessment of one's own potential and focuses on restoration and further development. Now, one can hear that we need to restore not to the state that existed before 2014 or 2022, but to maintain higher and more ambitious standards. The same thing happens in resilient communities—they set themselves the task of becoming better and more potent than before the "great war." This is the first thing that draws attention in strategic documents.

Of course, the resilience of communities is facilitated by the constant practice of informal networks, volunteer initiatives, and civil society institutions. Even where, for various reasons, such practices did not exist, people united independently and sometimes even "replaced" local government bodies if their work was paralyzed.

At the same time, the factors that weaken communities are often a mirror image of the aspects that contribute to resilience. For example, communities that have not been able to strengthen as a result of the decentralization reform are less able to adapt to the challenges of war. It is also necessary to emphasize the insufficient capacity of small communities. As a rule, these are small village communities [28]. They do not know how to plan their lives effectively, utilizing their strengths and weaknesses. In such communities, local governments and military administrations often fail to communicate effectively with residents and public organizations, unreasonably limit access to information related to their decisions, and fail to disseminate essential security information, such as evacuation procedures and the location of civil defense structures. Frontline cities, faced with a frantic outflow of population, must demonstrate at least some prospects to the economically active population that remains in the town, making these cities "alive" and not deserting them, and in the case of Zaporizhia, this means turning them into industrial hubs rather than turning them into industrial jungles. However, observing some discussions around reconstruction projects in frontline cities, one gets the impression that local authorities, when making decisions on using funds for conditional "development," are taking the easiest and fastest path. Perhaps the conditional ideas with the sites in Zaporizhia do have some rational component. Still, there is a lack of communication with the population and a lack of public justification for such decisions.

Migration caused by the war has also led to a critical reduction in some communities. For example, in two villages of the Stepnohirsk community of the Zaporizhia region, only about twenty peaceful residents remain. Law enforcement officers bring bread to people twice a week. Shops have not been open for a long time. Locals survive mainly on subsistence farming.

There are also problems in the rear regions that weaken communities to some extent. For example, several large enterprises have relocated to the Zakarpattia region; however, communities are not yet ready to capitalize on this opportunity for economic development, as they lack personnel with the necessary qualifications for new industries. At the same time, high unemployment remains among IDPs.

Mass displacements result in significant changes to the population structure of the receiving regions. Movement to cities can lead to an overload of infrastructure and social services, which, in turn, causes social tension. As of mid-June 2023, 4,871,807 internally displaced persons were registered in Ukraine, of whom 60% were women and 40% were men. One in five registered IDPs (21.6%) is a child under the age of 17. The same percentage is for people over 65. However, according to official estimates, the real number of IDPs is higher, since about 2 million citizens, although they have been forcibly displaced, have not registered as IDPs for various reasons. The majority of IDPs come from the East and South of the country-67% (approximately 3.4 million people) and 17% (approximately 867 thousand people), respectively. In particular, 25% come from the Kharkiv region, 21% from Donetsk, 10% from Zaporizhia, 10% from Kherson, and 7% from Luhansk [24].

Problems associated with mass forced displacement require significant efforts from the state, as well as communities of settlement and origin/return, to adapt, integrate/reintegrate affected persons, and provide them with social support. At the same time, IDPs themselves face complex and multifaceted tasks, as they have to endure the stress of a forced change of residence and adapt their lifestyle to new conditions in conditions of uncertainty. The unsatisfactory level of income and economic marginalization remain the primary obstacles to the integration of forcibly displaced migrants. A high level of lack of access to adequate housing was noted by 15%, and an average level by 12% of respondents focused

on integration, compared to 18% and 14%, respectively, among all IDPs; to food products by 6% and 10% and 7% and 13%, respectively. At the same time, forced migrants, oriented towards long-term residence in places of resettlement, as well as IDPs in general, noted a high risk of inability to participate in public life, 26% of respondents, which indicates an obviously insufficient level of integration of newcomers into local communities [24]. Such a land-scape that has emerged creates a "fertile environment" for processes of marginalization, a potential increase in crime levels, heightened social tension, and destructive societal processes.

It is interesting to note that back in 2018, a survey was conducted among National Police officers in the regions with the highest concentration of IDPs, namely, in the unoccupied part of the Donetsk region, the unoccupied part of the Luhansk region, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Poltava, and Kyiv regions, as well as in Kyiv. To obtain more objective data, the survey was also conducted in the Lviv, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv regions, to which a smaller number of IDPs moved compared to the areas mentioned above. The following survey results were obtained [25]:

- In the territory of the Kharkiv region, the process of internal displacement has exacerbated the conflict of citizens against the background of political, national, linguistic, etc. reasons;
- In the Zaporizhia region, the activities of organized criminal groups have intensified; such groups consist of local citizens and IDPs.
- Many people with antisocial attitudes have moved to the Dnipropetrovsk region; since the internal displacement, the number of crimes committed in the Dnipropetrovsk region has increased; IDP criminals carry weapons and drugs with them; the increase in the population entails an increase in the number of crimes.
 - Mercenary crime has grown rapidly.
- From among the IDPs, individuals who are unable to adapt to new living conditions have moved, and some of them commit crimes.
- Poor material security, lack of their own housing, and lack of work can encourage IDPs to commit a criminal offense.

Although there is no confirmed data on the level of crime among IDPs after 2022, it can obviously

be assumed that the negative processes listed above have intensified proportionally to the significant increase in the number of internal migrants.

All these processes and the landscape they create have military consequences for territorial communities. Overcoming these consequences requires effective institutional solutions, the creation of effective mechanisms, and the development of models that will help communities restore socio-economic stability and cohesion.

Conclusion

The study found that military mobility has a significant impact on community demographics. As the study demonstrates, frontline communities suffer enormous obstacles during wartime, including the psychological impact of persistent stress and security risks, which can result in violence and family instability. These areas also face infrastructural loss, a scarcity of human resources, and difficulty transferring companies or providing for military troops and their families. They also confront obstacles in meeting basic necessities, such as access to clean water and food, as well as the risk of environmental harm.

Rear communities are also characterized by the presence of certain challenges associated with infrastructure congestion, increasing social disintegration and tension, trends in crime growth, etc.

The examples analyzed in the work indicate the lack of a reasonable socio-economic policy that would take into account demographic characteristics, as well as changes in the economic profile of regions, including as a result of the relocation of enterprises and businesses. Therefore, there is an urgent need to combine the efforts of the authorities and civil society, with the involvement of all stakeholders, including the business sector, for a detailed systematic study and description of existing problems, and the further development of relevant concepts, strategic and tactical action plans, and roadmaps.

Novelty

The novelty of presented research lies in the systematization of the scattered mapping and comprehension of military migration implications for territorial communities in Ukraine.

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 Каройї Г.¹
 ID 0009-0006-1480-7245
 Акімов, О. О.⁴
 ID 0000-0002-9557-2276

 Акімова Л. М.²
 ID 0000-0002-2747-2775
 Карпа, М. І.⁵
 ID 0000-0001-8141-4894

 Міщук, Г. Ю.³
 ID 0000-0003-4520-3189

Воєнна міграція та демографічні трансформації в Україні: мілітарні наслідки для територіальних громад

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Міграція населення — одне з природних явищ, що відбувається в суспільстві незалежно від форми соціально-економічної системи та розглядається в рамках та на перетині різних наук. Однак воєнна міграція має свої унікальні особливості та унікальний ландшафт виникнення та перебігу її процесів. Предметом дослідження є комплекс проблем воєнної міграції в Україні, а також її вплив на соціально-економічний розвиток територіальних громад. Метою статті є відображення як видимої ситуації, так і латентних процесів

¹ Університет Джона фон Неймана, Будапешт

² Національний університет водного господарства та природокористування, Рівне

³ Університет Сечені Іштвана, Ґйор

⁴ Науково-методичний центр кадрової політики Міністерства оборони України, Київ

⁵ Університет Григорія Сковороди в Переяславі, Переяслав

у територіальних громадах України, спричинених воєнною міграцією під час російсько-української війни. Показано, що наслідки воєнної міграції мають як позитивний, так і негативний характер, стаючи джерелом конфліктів та зниження рівня життя в територіальних громадах. Підкреслюється необхідність об'єднання зусиль державних органів, громадянського суспільства та зацікавлених сторін для глибокого вивчення всіх аспектів наслідків воєнної міграції для громад з метою розробки ефективних моделей та стратегій подолання негативних тенденцій. Фундаментальні питання, пов'язані з воєнною міграцією, переосмислюються з метою включення деяких важливих нових польових даних, що з'явилися нещодавно, та окреслення політичних наслідків.

Ключові слова: внутрішня міграція; громадянське суспільство; конфлікти; наслідки військової міграції; стійкість громад; соціальна інтеграція.

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ДО ВІДОМА АВТОРІВ

До розгляду редакція «Українського географічного журналу» приймає лише оригінальні, не опубліковані раніше наукові статті, які висвітлюють актуальні питання, що є предметом дослідження природничо- та суспільно-географічних наук, а також географічної картографії, геоінформатики, краєзнавства та географічної освіти. Статті, що не відповідають профілю журналу, в яких не повною мірою дотримано рекомендації для авторів (див. сайт журналу), відхиляються редакційною колегією.

Для публікації в журналі приймаються рукописи українською та англійською мовами. Обов'язкова вимога для авторів з України, які надсилають статті англійською мовою, — до редакції подається також переклад рукопису українською мовою.

Обсяг: наукових статей — 14 сторінок (разом із резюме, таблицями та ілюстративним матеріалом), оглядових — 6—7 сторінок, інформації та рецензії — 3—4 сторінки (кг 12, міжрядковий інтервал — 1,5).

Структура статті: індекс УДК, прізвище, ім'я та по батькові автора чи авторів (повністю українською мовою та *їхня транс- пітерація англійською мовою*), ORCID автора (авторів), назва статті, резюме, ключові слова українською та у перекладі англійською (для наукових статей), текст статті. Список літератури та назва установи, де працює автор, — в оригіналі та переклад англійською мовою.

У статті мають бути виділені **рубрики**: «Актуальність теми дослідження»; «Стан вивчення питання, основні праці»; «Мета дослідження»; «Методи дослідження»; «Виклад основного матеріалу з обґрунтуванням наукових результатів» (може бути з підрубриками); «Висновки».

У **резюме** обсягом не менше 800 знаків українською мовою та англійською — не менше 1800 знаків мають бути викладені положення відповідно до структури статті (мета, методи дослідження, результати, новизна) і наведені ключові слова статті (не менше п'яти).

Список літератури подається з нумерацією за порядком посилань по тексту, оформлений згідно з такими вимогами: для монографій — прізвища та ініціали всіх авторів, повна назва

видання, рік, кількість сторінок; для статей у періодичних виданнях — прізвища та ініціали всіх авторів, повна назва праці; назва журналу, рік видання, сторінки, якщо ϵ — DOI.

У списку літератури для джерел не латиницею обов'язково додається англомовний переклад (прізвища авторів у транслітерації).

Посилання на джерела в статті — у квадратних дужках згідно з номером у списку літератури.

Таблиці, картографічний та ілюстративний матеріал нумеруються, на них робляться посилання в тексті.

Вся графіка має бути комп'ютерною, виконаною у чорнобілому варіанті в одному з форматів: TIFF, BMP, JPEG з роздільністю не менш 350 dpi. Обов'язково подавати окремо файли рисунків, графіків, схем тощо в електронному вигляді.

Кольорові рисунки не приймаються, якщо це питання попередньо не узгоджене з редакцією.

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Автори відповідають за точність викладених фактів, цитат, статистичних даних, бібліографічних довідок, написання географічних назв, власних імен.

Автори подають *відомості про себе*: прізвище, ім'я, по батькові, вчене звання, вчений ступінь, місце роботи, посада, адреса, телефони. E-mail.

Статті, що надходять до редакції «Українського географічного журналу», рецензуються. Прийняті до друку статті проходять наукове та літературне редагування.

Взаємовідносини авторів із редакцією врегульовуються Ліцензійним договором про передачу авторських прав (зразок на сайті журналу).

Для наукових статей надається цифровий ідентифікатор об'єкта — DOI (Digital Object Identifier) — універсальне гіперпосилання для пошуку публікацій в електронному науковому просторі.

Статті надсилати на адресу:

Редакція «Українського географічного журналу», Інститут географії НАН України, вул. Володимирська, 44, Київ 01054. **Тел.** +38 (044) 234—04—92.

E-mail: geojournal@ukr.net; офіційний сайт журналу: https://ukrgeojournal.org.ua